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This paper traces the innovation pathways of new creations from R & D activity 
through to intellectual property (IP) applications using enterprise panel data from 
1989 to 2002. Our estimation method explicitly addresses the selection issues 
associated with missing R&D data which is a common problem among this type of 
data set. We find that R&D activity is a highly path dependent process that relies 
heavily on firm specific effects. These firm specific effects were subsequently found 
to be correlated with managerial style – more aggressive and intuitive managers have 
higher R&D ceteris paribus – and extensive use of incentive schemes for employees 
within the firm. In addition, we find that R&D is higher when the previous year’s 
enterprise debt ratio is lower, the speed of technological change is faster, the firm’s 
ability to absorb knowledge spillovers is greater and the product market is less 
contestable. Furthermore, these firms appear to be using the various methods of 
appropriation, IP and non-IP, as complementary packages to capture the quasi-rents 
from previous R&D expenditure rather than as substitutes.  3
 
1. Introduction 
This paper estimates the major determinants of R&D activity among large Australian 
companies using a 14 year panel data set.
 † Two sets of equations are used to represent 
the sequence of new creations from R & D activity through to intellectual property 
(IP) registration. Relative to other studies in the area, there are three contrasting 
features of our analysis. First, our study specifically addresses the selection biases 
caused by missing R&D data. Secondly, it follows the decision about how much to 
invest in R&D activities through to the appropriability decision and thirdly, by 
merging qualitative data on companies obtained by directly surveying managers, it 
identifies some of the elements contained in the time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics. We find evidence that debt levels, speed of technical change pertinent 
to the firm and the firm’s ability to absorb knowledge spillovers all influence the 
decision to engage in R&D activity. However, there is clear evidence that R&D is a 
highly path-dependent process which relies on unobservable enterprise specific 
effects, such as the managerial style and the work culture. For those firms which 
undertook R&D, the different components of registered IP – patents, trade marks and 
designs – appear to be used as a package (rather than as solitary strategies), along with 
non-IP methods such as secrecy and lead time, to prevent imitation.  
Knowing the determinants of variation in the amount of firm R&D is important 
insomuch as it indicates variation in the level of innovation. Innovation, broadly 
defined, is almost the only form of activity that leads to sustained improvements in 
productivity. Most production is simply an arrangement of physical matter and since 
the amount of matter in the world is fixed, how cleverly people can engineer this re-
arrangement determines productivity. Innovation represents new ways to re-configure 
matter. For the purposes of this paper however, we limit innovation to the invention of 
new-to-the-world products. 
This paper begins with a discussion of what can be gained from studying R&D 
and innovation models, and what cannot. It follows in section 3 with a simple 
deductive model of the innovation investment decision, and in section 4 with a review 
                                                 
† Prior to this study, no panel data econometric examination had been undertaken of Australian research 
and innovation pathways, due to the absence of a long and comprehensive longitudinal data base.   4
from the empirical literature of the main expected determinants of the innovation 
pathway. We then discuss the data and, in particular, estimation issues that arise from 
the use of accounting, administrative and survey enterprise data sets. Bearing these 
complications in mind, in section 5, we present estimates of the determinants of 
enterprise R&D and, in section 6, for those that undertook R&D, their use of the IP 
system. Section 7 concludes. 
2. What do innovation models reveal? 
As an economic study, innovation has attracted increasing academic attention over the 
previous century. The percentage of articles referring to technology, invention or 
innovation, somewhere in its text, in leading economic journals has progressively 
risen from about 5 per cent in 1900 to over 40 per cent in 1999 (see Figure 1). In 
somewhat of a contrast, technology’s first cousin, ‘productivity’ became more 
common in articles published up to 1960
‡ but then waned until 1995 since when there 
has been a small resurgence. These trends stand in distinction to the number of articles 
referring to ‘competition’ which declined over the century and ‘prices’ which, while 
popular, exhibited no trend.  
It is not entirely clear why technology, invention and innovation have risen in 
prominence since the proposition that economic progress is driven by technological 
development is arguably centuries old. It is plausible however to suppose that the 
study and analysis of technology, invention and innovation has grown because 
increasingly, it is being engineered and directed by company managers, public policy 
makers and management strategists. Alternatively, or perhaps as a consequence, the 
contribution of technological change towards rising standards of living may be 
growing relative to other sources of productivity growth such as enhanced worker 
skills, changes to public regulations, reformed institutional behaviour and changes to 
the quality of (price) competition.  
                                                 






































Technology, invention or innovation  Price Productivity Competition  
Figure 1: Percentage of articles from nine leading economics journals
§ with specific 
words in the text, 1900 to 1999 
If we assume that either or both of these reasons are true, then it becomes more 
interesting to know and understand what characterises more innovative firms. 
Econometric models enable us to examine, in a general sense, whether 
interrelationships within industries and technology clusters are critical to firm 
outcomes. Ultimately however, the big question for economists is whether it is 
possible to empirically determine the most advantageous levels of innovation and/or 
public support for innovation. Regrettably, the findings from this paper, and other 
studies of this genre, do not offer a prescription for this question. Nonetheless, if 
governments believe that R&D and innovation should be further encouraged, then it 
behoves them to know what essentially distinguishes more innovative from less 
innovative firms and whether these factors are amenable through government or 
corporate policy. We may find for example that both contributions from science and 
knowledge spillovers are significant factors but while little can be done about 
increasing the contribution of basic science to firms’ technological opportunities, the 
government can have a strategic role enhancing knowledge spillovers and workforce 
skills. 
                                                 
§ This includes all journals published in JSTOR from 1900: American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, Economic Geography, Economic Journal, Economica, Oxford Economic Papers, 
Review of Economic Studies, Publications of the American Economic Association, and American 
Economic Association Quarterly.   6
As a step towards a clearer comprehension of the separate determinants of 
innovation, a large number of empirical studies have been conducted over the past 
three decades. Almost without exception, the level of sophistication of the estimation 
method is determined by the extensiveness of the database. Prior to the 1980s 
empirical analysis was largely undertaken using industry aggregated time series data 
(see Griliches 1995 for an overview). Enterprise level data bases, especially those 
requiring more than just accounting variables, are notoriously difficult to collect and 
early single equation models relied upon small samples of a single cross-section of 
data. Panel data studies did not emerge until 1981 (Griliches 1981), and, since then, 
there have been several such studies for the UK (Toivanen and Stoneman 1998, 
Blundell et al. 1999, Greenhalgh and Longland 2001, Greenhalgh et al. 2001, 
Bosworth et al. 2000, Toivanen et al. 2002, Bloom and Van Reenen 2002, 
Greenhalgh and Longland 2002), the USA (Ben-Zion 1984, Griliches 1986, Jaffe 
1986, Hall et al. 1986, Griliches et al. 1991, Hall 1993, Hall and Hall 1993, 
Himmelberg and Petersen 1994, Chauvin and Hirschey 1997, Chiao 2002), Canada 
(Johnson and Pazderka 1993) and Spain (Martinez-Ros and Labeaga 2002). 
Finding or devising a theoretical framework for the decision to invest in 
innovative activities is not straight forward and is almost universally neglected. The 
literature on the determinants of the investment decision is bifurcated between 
deductive reduced form modelling, which usually casts the decision in terms of the 
optimal capital stock, and the inductively driven case study findings. In the former, 
the determinants of investment are usually reduced to the tangible capital stock, rates 
of interest, dividends and the debt position of the unit of analysis (for examples see 
Jorgenson 1971, Kalecki 1968, Gordon 1993, Williams 1993). The application of 
these models is usually intended for inclusion into macroeconomic modelling and, or, 
time series estimation. However these models offer little insight into the motives for 
investment and why some units (firms) pursue more innovative strategies than others. 
By contrast, the inductive literature goes straight to the heart of the motivations for 
investing in innovation but offers little in the way of a guide for the specification of an 
equation for estimation. 
In an attempt to bridge this gap, we have devised a model in the following section 
to identify in the decision making process the costs and benefits of investing in 
innovative activities.   7
3. Modelling the innovation decision 
We begin with the postulate that some level of monopoly power is required by firms 
to cover their fixed costs
** and reduce the capriciousness and variability of their 
product demand that, with time, will expose a firm to near certain bankruptcy. Firms 
accordingly invest in intangible capital, of which innovation is a subset, in order to 
gain cost or demand side advantages, aka monopoly power. As such, the determinant 
of investment in innovation can be modelled as a component of an ex ante profit-
maximising set of decisions. We assume therefore that firms are seeking to maximise 
the present value of expected future profits – denoted as V. Because we are dealing 
with expectations, we assume that firms conceive of future revenues and costs as 
steady-state streams, not because they believe random fluctuations will not occur, but 
because, in general, they cannot predict one-off changes or exogenous events that 
cause these streams to rise or fall over time.
†† 
The expected revenue stream assumes that the quantity of products sold is a 
positive, but declining function of the level of investment into market expansion 
activities, denoted I. Investment in innovation is restricted here to production 
innovation, but in a more general model it will include advertising and other 
marketing, organisational and distributional activities related more to the process of 
production. Let us model expected average quantity sold, q, as: 
() β α + = I q ln    (1) 
where α  is a parameter representing the firm’s expected ability to convert market 
enhancing investments into actual sales, given the expected level of aggregate demand 
and habitual consumer buying patterns, β . Thus α  represents the effectiveness of 
investments in product innovations (due to cost advantages arising from basic science, 
knowledge spillovers and the firm’s capabilities) and the firm’s ability to appropriate 
revenues from these innovations. Subsequently, the present value R of an infinite 










                                                 
** Assuming rising marginal costs are the exception rather than the rule. 
†† ‘[W]e assume that the present is a …serviceable guide to the future...In other words we largely 
ignore the prospect of future changes about the actual character of which we know nothing.’ (Keynes 
1937, p214.)   8
where p is the price of the product, x is the premium the firm requires to 
compensate for the uncertainty associated with the investment activity I and r is the 
default-free rate of interest common across the whole economy. We assume that the 
market is not static; rival producers are also investing and so our designated firm has 
to continually invest in these activities in order to sustain a particular market position. 
Equation (2) depicts a fixed-price, variable quantity model. We could have similarly 
created a variable price model but this does not have a substantive effect on the final 
result and we retain the simple version.
‡‡ 
Assuming costs for each separate investment project are one-off, the present value 





=   
Expected profits are maximised subject to the limited availability of investment 
funds. Following Kalecki's (1939 pp285-93) principle of increasing risk, the level of 
investment funds, either through new equity or debt, is limited by the prior level of 
owners’ equity, S. This constraint may be modelled as: 
I S ≤  (3) 
The respective investment demand equations can be derived from maximising 
V=R-C subject to (3). The resulting product investment equation is: 









where λ  is the Lagrangian multiplier, which in our model is the shadow price of 
investment funds. Accordingly, the higher the product price p and expected success 
rate of investments into market expansion α , and the lower the uncertainty 
surrounding this activity x, the higher is the proposed investment activity. While this 
model suggests the likely determinants of firms’ decisions to invest in innovation, 
much is contained in the parameters, the effectiveness rate α , the shadow price of 
funds λ  and the premia for uncertainty, x.  
                                                 
‡‡ We assume here that the risk premia are equal across all investments, although this assumption is not 
strictly true in reality.   9
The following section itemises more closely the specific determinants of the 
effectiveness rate and the shadow price of funds using findings from the inductive 
literature. We are not able to include the uncertainty premia in the full model, but as 
will be revealed later when we analyse the fixed effects, managerial attitudes to risk 
are a significant determinant of the level of R&D spending ceteris paribus. Rather 
than present the innovation investment decision as a single equation, we model the 
process as two sets of equations: actual R&D expenditure and the registration of IP. 
4. The determinants of the innovation stages 
4.1 Research and development 
Investment in innovation is a process that begins with research and follows through to 
development, commercialisation and the utilisation of appropriation strategies. The 
factors that affect the decision to begin this process may be divided into cost or 
supply-side factors and revenue or demand-side factors.
§§  
The main cost considerations include: the opportunities afforded by the scientific 
sector, the flow of positive knowledge externalities emanating from related 
organisations, the ability of the firm to reap any economies of scale that may exist in 
R&D, the availability and cost of imitating the existing state of the art, the calibre of 
the firm’s internal capabilities and the cost of investment funds. We elaborate briefly 
on these issues below. 
With respect to the first factor, it has been argued that in general, the greater are 
the opportunities arising from science in the firm’s technology area the lower are the 
expected costs of innovation (Jaffe 1986, Cohen and Levinthal 1989). During the last 
few decades for example, basic and applied science has thrown up more possibilities 
in biotechnology and electronics than mechanics and textiles and accordingly we 
expect firms operating in these areas will engage in more R&D, ceteris paribus. 
                                                 
§§ While many of these factors can be related to firm size, increasingly the empirical literature has 
found that it is not size per se that confers the advantage but the underlying conditions of opportunity 
and appropriability (Cohen et al. 1987). However, this may not be true if size, and the underlying 
financial resources it implies, enhances the scope of an enterprise’s opportunity and appropriability 
sets. In addition, the literature has become increasingly wary of the role of market structure as a truly 
independent determinant of the intensity of competition and subsequent innovation decisions. Phillips 
(1966) and Sutton (1991) for example, have argued that the more intense the process of competition, 
the more concentrated the market may become. This theoretical scepticism has been complemented 
by empirical findings which suggest when other technological and economic features of the market 
are controlled for, market structure – usually denoted as concentration – loses significance (Levin et 
al. 1985, Scherer 1967, Bosworth and Rogers 1998).   10
In addition, more positive externalities in the technology area rising from other 
companies undertaking similar R&D through knowledge flows and skilled labour 
exchange will reduce those costs of firm’s own innovation (Jaffe 1986, Griliches 
1995). Firms vary according to how able they are to network, gather information, and 
subsequently opportunistically analyse this information. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
have argued that a firm’s learning or absorptive capacity is enhanced by its own R&D 
activity
*** and this may be enhanced by the presence of universities and other 
supportive scientific infrastructure.  
Thirdly, if there is a high minimum efficient scale (MES) in R&D production, for 
example because the minimum size of a viable laboratory is high, then we expect that 
large companies, with their greater access to investment funds will be advantaged.
 ††† 
It is plausible however, that MES relates more to reported R&D rather than actual 
R&D activity since informal and task-specific R&D is often carried out on-the-spot 
using existing tools.
‡‡‡ 
Fourthly, the fewer and more expensive are the alternative sources of innovation 
via licensing or foreign affiliates the lower the cost of imitation and less incentive for 
the firms to engage in its own R&D. It is plausible to assume that subsidiaries of 
foreign firms may come to rely upon its parent for inventions and innovative ideas. 
Related to this is the tendency for R&D branches of firms to be located close to head 
office (Leahy et al. 2004).  
Fifthly, the better developed the track record of managers and their workforce 
with respect to successful R&D and innovative activities, the lower the expected costs 
of subsequent innovation. The importance of these factors have been documented in 
the managerial science literature largely through case study analysis, although there 
are also several studies involving qualitative company surveys (see Lee 2002, 
Rothwell et al. 1974, Cohen 1995).
§§§ Because knowledge creation and learning are 
                                                 
*** Although these advantages may be eroded if the company’s products are in direct competition with 
each other. 
††† See also Levin et al. (1987a), Acs and Audretsch (1993), Kleinknecht et al. (1993), Cohen (1995). 
The survey by Levin and Reiss (1984) suggests that the inconclusive results may arise because the 
MES is low for many technologies. 
‡‡‡ Studies using data on innovations counts (as published in journals for example) suggest more 
ambiguity about the correlation between firm size and innovation intensity (see Kleinknecht et al. 
1993 for example). 
§§§ It has been suggested that large companies are less efficient in garnering the innovative potential of 
its employees due to bureaucratic frustrations and less directed pecuniary incentives (see the review 
by Cohen 1995).   11
both inputs and outputs of the inventive and innovation process, internal capabilities 
are generally considered path dependent, and thus subject to cumulative causation.  
Finally, regardless of the companies’ incentives to undertake R&D, they will not 
be able to execute their decisions without access to high risk investment finance. 
Prudent financiers (of either equity or debt) will not lend without some form of 
collateral, and the greater is the risk, the higher is the required collateral and loan 
premium for risk. The highest risk forms of investment, especially those that produce 
no tangible collateral, are consequently more likely to be sourced from retained 
earnings and we expect that firms with higher pre-existing profits and lower debt 
ratios will have fewer funding limitations imposed on them. Empirical studies have 
found, on balance, evidence that the firm’s financial state affects their investments in 
R&D (see Cohen 1995 for a review). 
From the demand side, we expect that ex ante returns to innovation will be 
greater: the stronger the ex ante growth in customer demand for the product and the 
more practical forms of appropriability, including registered IP, available to the firm. 
Both of these determinants are intuitive. Anticipated profits from innovation should 
be greater the higher is the expected growth in ex ante demand for the broad product 
market area and thus the greater the commercial use for both process and product 
innovations that lie within the scope of the area (Schmookler 1966). In addition, some 
technical features of product or process innovations are easier to codify and define 
and are thus more amenable to IP registration and protection. For example, drugs are 
technically easier to protect through patents; some processes are easier to protect 
through secrecy (Hunter 2002). Appropriability can also vary according to the 
economic conditions of the firm. Large companies, for example, may find it easier to 
both enforce their registered IP and produce and sell on a large scale. Foreign 
companies may expect higher rates of appropriation because they have an established 
channel for exploiting their new inventions in green field markets through intra-firm 
technology transfer (Dunning 1988, Caves 1982). 
4.2 Registered intellectual property 
While the availability of cheap and efficient modes of appropriation will affect the 
decision to invest in R&D, not all firms will seek to protect their invention through 
registered IP. It has been well documented in the US that while a high proportion of   12
potentially significant inventions are patented in pharmaceutical and chemicals, the 
rates are considerably less for other fields (see Mansfield 1986, Levin et al. 1987b). 
The coverage rates for trade marks and designs are less well documented, but research 
by Jensen and Webster (2004) finds that IP counts are not well correlated with process 
innovations. Three forms of registered IP are used in our model: patents, trade marks 
and designs. While patents are used to claim monopoly ownership over a potential 
future new product or process, trade marks can be complementary to the launch of a 
new product (Loundes and Rogers 2003), and designs are used to claim monopoly 
over the appearance of a new product. 
We expect that the higher is the level of R&D expenditure the greater is the 
chance of producing one or more of these innovations in any year and that there will 
be systematic differences in the rate at which firms seek legal protection for a 
potentially significant innovation. Certain technologies are more clearly defined and 
protected by legal means and certain firms may anticipate that they can more 
effectively utilise legal means of protection than others.   
Accordingly, the registration of a potentially significant innovation will depend on 
first, the features of the invention such as the ease of imitation, codifiability and the 
definition of clear invention boundaries (Griliches et al. 1987). Technologies that are 
more amenable to both patent documentation and imitation by competitors stand to 
gain most from patent and design protection. In the case of trademarking activity, the 
scope of apparent market opportunities for particular products or the number of 
competitors, rather than the actual technology of the underlying product, may 
determine the trademarking rate.  
Secondly, the IP registration rate will be lower the greater the expected economic 
loss through disclosure. Because new products are disclosed when sold, there is less 
expected disclosure loss than for process innovations which need never be publicly 
disclosed to be used. 
Thirdly, because using the legal system is costly, the firm would need to have the 
resources to finance the fixed costs of the complete IP application and be prepared to 
defend the title if necessary.   13
Finally, we expect that the more serviceable are alternative forms of 
appropriability available to the firm, the less likely they will be to register for IP 
protection.  
5. The R&D equation 
5.1 The econometric model 
Since innovative activities are a sequence of events which are linked over time and do 
not occur simultaneously, we have modelled the equations as separate equations 
rather than a system of equations. The following sections consider the estimations of 
first, the R&D expenditure decision and then the decision to protect innovation 
through registered IP. 
The major modelling issue for estimating the R&D expenditure decision is how to 
treat missing R&D data. In our data set which is described in Appendix 1, R&D 
expenditure is collected from company annual reports, supplemented with telephone 
survey information. However, there still remain a very large proportion of missing 
data (85.3 per cent) and it is not possible to discern whether these represent true zeros, 
R&D spending below a threshold limit or the non-reporting of values above this 
threshold.
**** Most likely, missing values are a combination of all three. According to 
Table 1, about 1.5 per cent of the R&D data refer to missing annual values for 
enterprises which have also reported significant values in other years, and a further 
12.3 per cent refer to enterprises that never report R&D expenditure but had made 
patent applications during the same period. Both these cases most likely represent 
non-reported positive R&D values. 
Table 1: Firm characteristics of R&D observations, 1989- 2002 
Type of R&D records  Freq.  Percent 
No. observations where firm reports R&D at 
some time in its history    
- complete set of R&D observations  2,733  16.8 
- gaps in set of R&D observations  248  1.5 
No. observations where firm never reports R&D 
in its history 
  
- has a history of patent applications  2,009  12.3 
                                                 
**** However, despite it being a requirement of accounting standards, in practice, only subsets of this 
R&D are formally recorded (often to obtain special tax treatment), or reported in published 
accounting statements. Stoneman and Toivanen (2001) for example, found that among listed UK 
firms, that large companies were most likely to report R&D. We find that manufacturing, public and 
foreign owned companies are more likely to report R&D than other companies.   14
- has no history of patent applications  11,315  69.4 
    
Total 16,305  100.0 
Most existing studies of the determinants of R&D do not discuss or explicitly treat 
missing R&D data points. However, missing R&D data are endemic in accounting 
based data sets and these omissions can be important if there are selection issues. It 
seems reasonable to assume that missing values for R&D expenditure for firms which 
are also patenting, do not constitute true zeros. A cross-sectional multinomial logit 
model relating each of the categories of R&D reporting to industry type, company 
type and type of ownership suggests that firms reporting R&D, compared with those 
that neither report or apply for patents, are most likely to be in manufacturing, 
electricity, gas and water, communications and agriculture, and least likely to be in 
education, accommodation, cafes and restaurants. They are also more likely to be 
medium size, foreign owned or public companies, ceteris paribus.  
If the panel nature of the data is accommodated by estimating a fixed-effects 
model with fixed effects for the firms, then the fixed effects term will capture any 
sample selection bias caused by the omission of observations from firms who never 
report R&D. This fact can be demonstrated by considering a two-equation sample 
selection model (see, for example Verbeek 2000, p.206). In the context of our model, 
we have the R&D equation  
  ,1 ,1 it i i t i t it RD RD −− =α +δ + +εX β  (5) 
where the subscripts i and t refer to the i-th firm in the t-th time period and the vector 
X represents the independent determinants of the decision.  
In addition, there is a participation, or selection, equation 
ii i wu ∗= + z γ  (6) 
where a firm reports R&D when the latent variable  i w
∗  is positive and does not report 
R&D for  0 i w
∗ ≤ . The vector  i z  contains time-invariant firm characteristics including 
variables such as industry type, type of corporation and type of ownership. It is 
assumed that the error terms ( , ) it i u ε  have a bivariate normal distribution with zero 
mean, 
2 var( ) it ε= σ , var( ) 1 i u =  and correlation ρ . Then, given that firms that do not   15
report R&D are discarded, the relevant expectation for estimating the R&D equation 
is  
  ,1 ,1 (| , 0 ) ( | 0 ) it i t i i i t it it i ER D R D w R D E w
∗∗
−− >= α + δ + +ε > X β  (7) 
where 
  (| 0 ) (| ) (| ) () /() it i it i i i i i i i Ew Eu E u u
∗ ε> = ε > − = ρ σ > − = ρ σ φ Φ z γ z γ z γ z γ  (8) 
and  (.) φ  and  (.) Φ  are the standard normal density and distribution functions, 
respectively. Since the term  ( )/ ( ) ii ρσφ Φ z γ z γ  is time invariant, it can be 
incorporated into the fixed effect  i α . Relaxing the assumption of normality (as would 
be necessary if, for example, non-reporting was explained by a logit model) changes 
the exact expression for  (| 0 ) it i Ew
∗ ε>, but does not alter the fact that it is time 
invariant. As discussed above, most of the ‘decision’ to report R&D depends on time 
invariant characteristics such as the industry and ownership of the firm. We ignored 
the very small number of observations (accounting for 1.5 per cent of all 
observations) where non-reporting of R&D was time varying.  
The vector  it X  includes company size (i.e. sales revenue), demand conditions 
(change in industry sales), the ability of the firm to finance new risky investments 
(lagged company profits, lagged debt ratio), local knowledge spillovers (R&D by 
firms in same technology area – as defined by those that patent in each technical area, 
interaction of the latter with own R&D), scientific opportunity (US patenting activity 
over previous five years in related technology area
††††), technical and economic 
conditions of appropriability (profit mark-up, expected sales). Each of these variables 
was lagged one period to allow for a delayed impact on R&D expenditure.  
The firm specific fixed factor,  i α , will capture time invariant aspects of R&D 
behaviour including managerial attitudes, internal firm capabilities, access to 
investment funds and technology, firm-specific conditions of appropriability as well 
as the selection term. According to Cohen (1995), both technical opportunity and 
appropriability conditions, while variable, are relatively inert and a considerable 
portion of their impact will be reflected in the firm specific fixed effects. 
                                                 
†††† This may also correlate with inherent ease of appropriability associated with specific technology 
areas.   16
Including the lagged dependent variable  ,1 it RD −  allows for path dependency; 
expenditure on R&D by a firm is likely to depend on the past history of that firm’s 
R&D expenditure. However, inclusion of  ,1 it RD −  also complicates the estimation 
procedure. For large N (the number of firms) and small T (the number of time series 
observations), which are characteristics of our data,  the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
fixed effects estimator is inconsistent. As an alternative estimation procedure, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalized method of moments procedure that 
uses as instruments lagged values of the dependent variable, and the exogenous 
variables differenced, and applies them to a differenced version of the original 
equation.  
In addition to the results from the Arellano-Bond estimator, we report estimates 
from the OLS-estimated fixed effects model and an OLS-estimated model with 
dummy variables for industry type, company type and foreign ownership, and no 
fixed effects for firms. Since instrumental variable estimators typically obtain 
consistency at the expense of increased variance, it is also useful to consider results 
from the OLS fixed effects estimator that, despite its small-T bias, is likely to have a 
lower variance. The model with industry, company and foreign ownership dummies 
but no fixed effects for firms is considered for two reasons. First, it permits across-
firm variation in R&D within each industry and company type (in addition to within-
firm variation over time) to be explained by corresponding variation in the 
explanatory variables; and, second, it seems reasonable to hypothesize (as we do in 
what follows) that the magnitudes of the fixed effects for each firm can be related to 
industry type, company type and foreign ownership. 
5.2 Estimations results 
The results are presented in Table 2. The use of a differenced equation and lagged 
instruments means the data demands of the Arellano-Bond estimator are greater and 
so fewer companies and less observations are used to compute values for this 
estimator.   
Two access-to-finance variables, lagged net profits before tax and the lagged debt 
ratio, were tested to see if they had the expected effect on R&D expenditure. As can 
be seen from the first column of estimates, only the debt ratio was correctly signed 
and it was only weakly significant in the Arellano-Bond estimation but significant in   17
the both the industry/company-dummy and fixed effects OLS estimations. 
Nonetheless, it suggests that firms with a higher level of relative debt are less likely to 
subsequently invest in R&D, presumably due to the risk associated with this form of 
investment. This outcome is consistent with the findings in Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) which show that among a sample of high-tech firms, cash flow (retained 
earnings) had a substantial effect on the level of R&D expenditure and with Geroski 
et al. (2002) who used panel data with a system of recursive equations to show that 
cash flow had a significant but only very small effect on R&D and patents. 
A variable to proxy for knowledge spillovers was constructed as the sum of all 
R&D expenditure conducted in the previous year by other firms patenting in the same 
technology areas as the subject firm, interacted with the lagged R&D expenditure by 
the subject firm. The interaction term has been included to represent the subject firm’s 
ability to absorb and apply this knowledge. This variable was weakly significant in 
the Arellano-Bond estimation but highly significant in the OLS estimations. 
Measuring opportunities from science for the purposes of estimation is difficult 
and not wholly successful (see Cohen 1995 for a discussion). Nonetheless, we 
attempted to capture two aspects of the technological area the enterprise appeared to 
be working in. To ensure that these variables were exogenous from the Australian 
research environment, we used technology specific data from the USA (the average of 
the previous 5 years).
‡‡‡‡ The first indicator, the technology cycle time, represents how 
fast the technology is turning over, defined as the median age in years of the US 
patent references cited on the front page of the company's patents. In fast moving 
technologies, companies may gain the advantage by innovating more quickly.
§§§§ The 
second measure is the number of forward patents cites in each technology area (the 
number of citations a patent receives from subsequent patents) which indicates how 
often the technology becomes prior art in future technological advances. Harhoff et al. 
(1999), among others, have shown that highly cited patents represent economically 
and technically important inventions. However, firms that did not patent, and hence 
could not be classified to a technology area (using their IPC), were assigned the 
residual class data. Accordingly, we should be somewhat cautious about the findings. 
                                                 
‡‡‡‡ Data was from CHI research. See 
http://www.chiresearch.com/about/data/tech/indicator.php3#growth. 
§§§§ According to CHI Research, cycle times are short (3-4 years) in semiconductors, but long (more 
than 10 years) in shipbuilding. The average is 8 years.   18
Bearing this in mind, only the coefficients on the technology cycle were significant 
and correctly signed: enterprises apparently working in fast moving technological 
areas tended to undertake more R&D, ceteris paribus. This finding is consistent with 
the Geroski et al. (2002) results which support the view that conditions of technical 
opportunity are more important than capital market limitations.  
To capture the effects of exogenous demand conditions, we have included a 
variable to indicate the recent growth in production in the main industry of the 
enterprise. This, and other proxies for demand, such as the lagged change in the 
enterprise sales, were only significant in the cross-sectional equation but were not 
significant in the panel estimations. 
Finally, the large value of rho (0.633), the proportion of the residual variance in R 
& D explained by firm specific effects, calculable only for the OLS equation, suggests 
that the combined time invariant aspects of R&D behaviour, managerial attitudes, 
internal firm capabilities and technology, access to investment funds, firm-specific 
conditions of appropriability and selection issues are very important. To separate the 
effects of these different elements, we regressed the fixed effects against qualitative 
management data we have obtained on many of these companies from a separate 
survey conducted over the period 2001 to 2003 (see the appendix for details of this 
survey). Table 2: Determinants of R&D expenditure (A$000) among large companies, Australia, 1991 to 2002.  
Dep var: R&D expenditure 
(‘000)
(a)  Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z Coef. z 
Path  dependent  effects              
Lagged  R&D  expenditure  0.519**  48.33  0.25** 18.24 0.547** 16.44 0.550** 18.58 
Firm size              
Employees
(b)  0.391**  11.31  0.77** 9.57  0.740** 7.69  0.734** 7.73 
Access to Finance              
Lagged net profits before tax  0.001*  2.31  -0.0039**  -3.95  -0.0001  -0.08     
Lagged  debt  ratio  -1500*  -2.16  -2239* -2.27  -2093 -1.55  -2109 -1.57 
Access to knowledge 
spillovers 
            
Lagged  absorption  0.706**  8.39  0.57**  7.23 0.169 1.4 0.166  1.38 
Scientific opportunity
(c)              
Lagged length of technology 
cycle  -419.5**  -3.29  -397.3** -2.42 -538.0* -2.16 -533.8* -2.14 
Lagged patent citations      12.12  0.01  -583.7  -0.36     
Demand conditions              
Change in value added in 
industry  1064**  2.39  235.26 0.61  7.28 0.13     
No.  companies  402    402   286   286  
No.  observations  1673    1673   1267   1267  
R 
2 –  within    0.76    0.345        
Test for significance of 
dummies  F=5.36**            
Rho
(d)      0.673        
corr(u_i,  Xb)        0.354        
Estimation method  OLS & 
Dummies    Fixed 
effects    Arellano-
Bond    Arellano-
Bond   
Notes: (a) All financial variables have been deflated by the CPI (1989-90=100). (b) Missing values for employees have been imputed from lagged employees and current sales revenue. (c) Missing 
values for the scientific opportunity variables have been imputed as the residual technology category ‘30’ in the CHI data base. 
Significance: ** 1%, *5%, †10%.  
Data from this survey allowed us to construct a series of variables on external product 
market conditions, internal management techniques and human resource management 
methods. The external product market conditions were represented by a series of 16 industry 
dummies to reflect the 17 major industry groups, a measure of product market volatility 
(based on the uncertainty scales of Miller and Droge 1986), and a measure of the ease of 
entry for competitors into the industry. Three different types of management style were 
distinguishable from the data (rather than a priori). The first style, ‘inflexible’, reflected the 
inflexibility and unresponsiveness of the organisation’s functional areas. The second, 
‘systematic’, indicated managerial reliance upon formal and extensive quantitative analysis 
rather than intuitive information for making decisions. The third factor, ‘aggressive’, 
reflected how aggressive managers were in the face of uncertainty and how willing they were 
to initiate competitive clashes with rival companies. The last management technique variable 
was a measure of how, and to what extent, the firm made an effort to communicate with its 
employees. This variable, ‘communication’, gives weight to organisations that have clear 
strategic missions that are understood throughout the enterprise, use several procedures to 
communicate with staff, involve employees directly in decisions and act on suggestions of 
employees. 
Finally, four aspects of the firm’s human resource management methods were measured 
in the survey. First, the variable ‘selection methods’ measures the firm’s use of explicit 
selection criteria and its provision of career paths and training programs for employees. 
Secondly, ‘team work’ measures the firm’s use of team and its willingness to act on the 
decisions and suggestions of employees. Thirdly, ‘pay rewards’ measures the firm’s use of 
pecuniary incentives to reward employees and finally, ‘other’ includes firm offers pastoral 
support, flexible working times and internally consistent human resource management 
practices. 
We were able to match the survey information for 122 of the 390 firms which reported 
R&D and for which information on industry, company type and foreign ownership status 
was available. Accordingly, we estimated three regressions with the fixed effects from Table 
2, as the dependent variable and with the qualitative survey information, industry type, 
company type and ownership status as explanatory variables. In the first regression, all 
variables were included and only 122 observations were used. In the second all 390 
observations were included, but the qualitative survey variables were excluded. The third 
regression was a compromise between the first two. It included all 390 observations and the   22
survey variables; to accommodate the missing data on the survey variables a dummy variable 
‘Missing management variables’ was set to 1 if there were no survey variables, and the 
values of these survey variables were set to zero. This equation is likely to provide a 
reasonable approximation if the survey variables are uncorrelated with industry, company 
type and ownership status. The results from these regressions, which are presented below in 
Table 3, reveal that whether or not the firm was covered by the survey was not related to the 
magnitude of the fixed effect and consequently we assume that the coefficients for the survey 
variables are representative of all firms. With respect to these other variables, we found that 
firms with a specific propensity to undertake more R&D expenditure were also more likely 
to have a foreign parent, less likely to sell into contestable product markets, were more likely 
to use intuitive decision making methods (as opposed to using formal, systematic tools), 
were more aggressive and bold in their managerial posture and were more likely to make 
extensive use of pecuniary incentives to reward high performing employees. The other 
factors were not significant at the five per cent level.  
Table 3: Determinant of firm specific effects (R&D equation) 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 3 (ex-
insignif. variables) 
Explanatory  variables  Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
×  1 Public company  -424.4  -0.24  634.8  0.7  560.44  0.61   
×  1 Foreign parent  1622.7  0.9  1621.6† 1.85  1727.37† 1.94  1415.1† 1.89 
×  1 Missing management variables       189.73  0.04   
External product market (Likert scales)           
Volatile  224.1  0.29    -295.77  -0.41   
Contestability  -1063.1† -1.82      -702.63 -1.26  -716.6 -1.48 
Management variables (Likert scales)           
Inflexible  605.0  0.72    465.54  0.58   
Systematic  -1968.0* -2.13      -2052.5* -2.29  -1951.2* -2.41 
Aggressive  1183.1 1.22      1402.10 1.53  1352.3† 1.76 
Communication  1354.5  0.95    1041.98  0.78   
Human resource management (Likert 
scales) 
         
Selection  methods  -1698.8  -1.08    -1044.74  -0.76   
Team  work  25.4  0.02    319.07  0.29   
Pay  rewards  953.7 0.67      1010.24 0.80  1330.6* 2.11 
Other  89.0  0.1    -47.15  -0.06   
Industry variables (Dummy variables)          
×  1 Mining  13412.0 1.58  1204.2 0.48  1163.59 0.46     
×  1 Manufacturing  7747.7 0.97  659.1 0.31  629.95 0.30     
×  1 Electricity, Gas & Water Supply  3405.0  0.39  -2931.2 -0.99  -2932.59 -0.95  -3471.8 -1.61 
×  1 Construction  na  na  -2208.1 -0.57  -1886.52 -0.49     
×  1 Wholesale Trade  8953.1  1.1  143.9 0.06  180.06 0.08     
×  1 Retail Trade  4533.4  0.49  -2182.4 -0.59  -1731.93 -0.47     
×  1 Transport & Storage  6870.8  0.74  -3639.6 -1.04  -3696.53 -1.03  -4147.4 -1.49 
×  1 Communication Services  -19567† -1.75  -8856.0* -2.43  -8721.8* -2.39  -9029** -3.03   24
×  1 Finance & Insurance  6393.0 0.71  196.5 0.07  200.24 0.07     
×  1 Property & Business Services  6926.0 0.82  588.0 0.24  645.09 0.26     
×  1 Health & Community Services  1769.6  0.16  -2100.1 -0.49  -2283.19 -0.54     
×  1 Cultural & Recreational Services  10393.3 1.16  838.7 0.23  1740.40 0.46     
Sample  122   390   390   390  
Adj-R
2  0.08   0.02   0.02   0.05  
Test  for  significance  of  industry  dummies  F=1.12     F=1.12    
Estimation  method  OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS  
Notes: Missing industry is Education. 6. The registered IP equations 
6.1 The econometric model 
The second set of equations describes what influences the firm’s decision to use registered IP 
forms of appropriability, given they are conducting R&D. As discussed in the previous 
section, the influencing factors include the ease of imitation, the ability to codify and define 
clear boundaries around the invention, the use of complementary or substitutable 
appropriation methods, anticipated economic loss through disclosure and the ability of a firm 
to pay for fixed costs of IP registration and possible enforcement.  
Equations were estimated to explain the three measures of registered intellectual 
property, patents (PT), trade marks (TM) and designs (DS). Using some general notation, 
these equations can be expressed as  
it i it PT ε ϖ φ + + = it W   (9) 
it i it TM η ϕ + + = θ Yit   (10) 
it i it DS ξ ϑ γ + + = it Z  (11) 
The coefficients  i φ ,  i ϕ  and  i γ  denote firm fixed effects while W, Y and Z denote the relevant 
explanatory variables included in each of the equations. There are two modelling/data issues 
that complicate estimation. First, to the extent that patents, designs and trade marks are used 
to reinforce the appropriability strategies of the firm, there is likely to be correlation within 
companies between the three types of registrations. Two possible ways to accommodate this 
correlation are (i) to allow for correlation between the error terms  it ε ,  it η  and  it ξ  or (ii) to 
use a simultaneous equation framework where W, Y and Z each include the two IP 
registrations from the other equations. The second estimation complication is the count 
nature of the IP registrations. It suggests that a count data regression model such as the 
Poisson or negative binomial model might be appropriate. However, the large number of 
zeros corresponding to firms that never register any form of IP is likely to make a simple 
count data model inadequate.
*****  
Together, these two complications imply some kind of multivariate or simultaneous 
equation count data model, with fixed effects, is likely to be suitable. Estimation techniques 
                                                 
***** Of those firms undertaking R&D in the previous year, the percentage recording no IP applications were 
80.8, 49.9 and 89.7 for patents, trade marks and designs respectively.   26
for such models are not well developed (see Cameron and Trivedi 1998 for an idea of the 
difficulties that arise). As a compromise, we accommodated the correlation between the three 
IP registrations by including in each equation the other two IP registrations, but we did not 
employ a simultaneous equation estimation technique. Given the choice between ignoring 
the complementarities between the three facets of IP and incurring some bias in the 
estimators, we opted for the latter. We estimated OLS fixed effect models as well as Poisson 
and negative binomial fixed effects models but found that the OLS estimates appeared as 
least as good, if not superior, to those from the other models and accordingly, only the OLS 
estimates are reported in what follows. 
6.2 Estimations results 
Results from Table 4 indicate that the amount of prior R&D was a marginally important 
influence on the probability of applying for a patent, but not for trade marks and designs. 
Given the level of last years R&D, the number of patent applications was higher for medium 
size firms (cf larger) but the number of trademarking and design applications was higher for 
large firms. Prior profits tend to induce patent and design application, but not trademarking 
which might suggest that financial resources are less important for the trademarking 
decision. Finally, we note that patents appear complementary to trade marks and designs, but 
trade marks are not complementary to designs. This suggests that IP is being used by firms 
as a package of methods to appropriate profits rather than as substitutes.  
Similar to the R&D equations, firm specific effects are important and ‘explained’ about 
half of the variation in patent and trade mark applications and nearly ninety per cent of 
design applications once the other listed factors are accounted for; a finding consistent with 
Hall et al. (1986). Recall from the previous section that these effects should reflect the time 
invariant characteristics of the invention such as the ease of imitation, codifiability and the 
economic loss through disclosure. In addition, it will also include the time-invariant 
availability of complementary or substitutable appropriation methods. Similar to the fixed 
effects for the R&D equation, we regressed the fixed effects estimated from the three 
separate IP equations against, firm type and ownership, industry and the extent of use of non-
IP methods for capturing rents from innovations from the survey. These results which are 
presented in Table 5 to Table 7 reveal that having a foreign parent, being in an industry other 
than property and business services and cultural and recreational services was associated 
with a higher patenting rate per dollar of R&D expenditure. Additionally, more extensive use   27
of the non-IP forms of appropriation such as secrecy, lead time and moving down the 
learning curve, were associated with a greater rate of patenting, not less, as expected a priori. 
Trade mark firm specific effects were significantly greater, per dollar of R&D 
expenditure, for domestic companies, for firms in manufacturing, communication services 
and cultural and recreational services and significantly less for mining, transport and storage 
and retail trade. For designs, the only significant, and positive, variables were being a public 
company and having a foreign parent. 
Table 4: Determinants of IP use among large companies, Australia, 1991 to 2002 (includes 
only those which undertook R&D in previous year) 
Explanatory variables  Patent count  Trade mark count  Design count 
  Coef.  t Coef.  t Coef.  t 
Level of lagged R&D 
expenditure  10.43 1.37  -27.57 -0.8  7.638 0.75 
Time (years)  -0.010 -0.51 0.010  0.12  -0.040 -1.55 
Firm size        
Lagged employees  -66.3** -2.49  776.28**  6.55  62.77†  1.76 
Complementary IP        
Patent applications     0.708**  5.63 0.158**  4.22 
Trade mark applications  0.034** 5.63      -0.002  -0.28 
Design applications  0.088** 4.22  -0.027  -0.28     
Access to Finance        
Lagged net profits before tax  37.0 1.60  -1018.6  -10.1  59.869† 1.93 
Lagged debt ratio  0.219  0.71 -0.818  -0.59 -0.260  -0.63 
No. companies  396    396    396   
No. observations  1657    1657    1657   
Rho

















corr(u_i, Xb)   0.313    0.264   0.014  
Notes: (a) All financial variables have been deflated by the CPI (1989-90=100). (b) Missing values for employees have been 
imputed from lagged employees and current sales revenue. (c) Percentage of remaining variation in dependent variable, after 
controlling for the independent variables, that is explained by fixed effects, (d) Results for negative binomial and Poisson not 
dissimilar and accordingly have been omitted.  
Table 5: Determinant of firm specific effects (Patents equation) 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 3 (ex-
insignif. variables) 
Explanatory  variables  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
×  1 Public company  0.945†  1.76  0.513*  2.1  0.460†  1.910   
×  1 Foreign parent  -0.784  -1.51 -0.229  -0.96 -0.259 -1.090  0.566**  2.770 
×  1 Missing management variables       0.757  0.830   
Appropriation (Likert scales)           
Use of non-IP forms of appropriability  0.392†  1.7      0.302  1.590  0.150**  3.380 
Industry variables (Dummy variables)          
×  1 Mining  1.452  0.61 0.284  0.41 0.262 0.380     
×  1 Manufacturing  0.383  0.18 0.337  0.6 0.197 0.350     
×  1 Electricity, Gas & Water Supply  0.109  0.05 0.669  0.84 0.324 0.410     
×  1 Construction     -0.117  -0.14 -0.027 -0.030     
×  1 Wholesale Trade  1.001  0.45 0.282  0.46 0.217 0.360     
×  1 Retail Trade  -0.716 -0.28 0.793  0.91 0.728 0.840     
×  1 Transport & Storage  -1.154  -0.43 -0.045  -0.04 -0.198 -0.200     
×  1 Communication Services  5.294†  1.72 0.807  0.85 0.813 0.870     
×  1 Finance & Insurance  -0.855  -0.36 -0.385  -0.52 -0.534 -0.730 -0.705 -1.450 
×  1 Property & Business Services  -0.134 -0.06 0.060  0.09 0.083 0.130     
×  1 Health & Community Services  -0.430  -0.14 -0.305  -0.25 -0.462 -0.380     
×  1 Cultural & Recreational Services  -0.981  -0.4 -0.580  -0.67 -0.808 -0.930 -0.908 -1.380 
Constant  -2.297  -0.9 -0.770  -1.31 -1.573 -1.450  -0.826** -4.830 
Sample  109   355   355   355  
Adj-R
2  0.03   0.0   0.02   0.05  
Test for significance of industry dummies  F=1.44       F=0.98    
Estimation  method  OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS  
Notes: Missing industry is Education.   30
 
Table 6: Determinant of firm specific effects (Trade marks equation) 
  Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 3 (ex-
insignif. variables) 
Explanatory  variables  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
×  1 Public company  0.91 0.33 0.86 0.73  0.515  0.440     
×  1 Foreign parent  -0.69  -0.26  -1.60  -1.38 -1.488 -1.300 -1.639 -1.650 
×  1 Missing management variables       -8.746**  -1.980  -3.635**  -3.510 
Appropriation (Likert scales)           
Use of non-IP forms of appropriability  -1.25  -1.07  -2.39  -0.84  -1.099  -1.190     
Industry variables (Dummy variables)          
×  1 Mining  -7.47  -0.61  -3.01  -0.9 -3.772 -1.150 -2.783 -1.350 
×  1 Manufacturing  2.15 0.19 2.33 0.86  1.405  0.520  2.017†  1.920 
×  1 Electricity, Gas & Water Supply  -1.06  -0.09 0.92 0.24  -1.466  -0.380     
×  1 Construction     -1.98  -0.47  -1.701  -0.410   
×  1 Wholesale Trade  -3.03  -0.26 0.85 0.29  0.232  0.080     
×  1 Retail Trade  -7.48  -0.57 -10.74**  -2.54 -12.08**  -2.890 -11.07**  -3.380 
×  1 Transport & Storage  -5.53 -0.41 -5.45 -1.11  -6.477  -1.340  -5.6  -1.390 
×  1 Communication Services  71.81** 4.58  15.80** 3.45  15.409**  3.420  16.175**  4.330 
×  1 Finance & Insurance  -3.99 -0.33 -0.63 -0.18  -1.779  -0.500     
×  1 Property & Business Services  -4.24 -0.34 -0.98 -0.31  -1.395  -0.450     
×  1 Health & Community Services  4.82 0.31 0.23 0.04  -0.386  -0.070     
×  1 Cultural & Recreational Services  6.14 0.49  9.48** 2.24  7.993†  1.910  8.69**  2.650 
Constant  6.04  0.47     6.250 1.190 0.865 0.740 
Sample  109   355   355   355  
Adj-R
2  0.27   0.08   0.12   0.13  
Test for significance of industry dummies  F=3.58**       F=3.34**    
Estimation  method  OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS  
Notes: Missing industry is Education.   31
 
Table 7: Determinant of firm specific effects (Designs equation) 





×  1 Public company  1.652† 1.850 1.417 1.660 
×  1 Foreign parent  1.096 1.250 1.283 1.560 
×  1 Missing management variables  0.033  0.010   
Appropriation (Likert scales)       
Use of non-IP forms of appropriability  -0.172  -0.240   
Industry variables (Dummy variables)      
×  1 Mining  -2.173  -0.860   
×  1 Manufacturing  -0.738  -0.360   
×  1 Electricity, Gas & Water Supply  -1.005  -0.340   
×  1 Construction  -1.739  -0.550   
×  1 Wholesale Trade  -1.237  -0.560   
×  1 Retail Trade  -2.462  -0.770   
×  1 Transport & Storage  -2.370  -0.640   
×  1 Communication Services  -3.256  -0.940   
×  1 Finance & Insurance  -1.642  -0.610   
×  1 Property & Business Services  -1.962  -0.820   
×  1 Health & Community Services  -1.702  -0.380   
×  1 Cultural & Recreational Services  -0.585  -0.180   
Constant  -0.025 -0.010 -1.331 -1.510 
Sample  355   355  
Adj-R
2  -0.02   0.00  
Estimation  method  OLS   OLS  
Notes: Missing industry is Education. 7. Conclusions 
In contrast to other studies in this area, our analysis has first specifically addressed the 
selection biases caused by missing R&D data. Secondly, we have followed the decision 
about how much to invest in R&D activities through to the appropriability decision and 
thirdly, by merging in qualitative data on companies from directly surveying managers, we 
have identified some of the elements contained in the time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics. One of the most consistent findings from our series of estimated equations 
has been that firm specific and / or path dependent effects are a very significant determinant 
of the innovation pathway taken by the company; a result also found by Scott (1984), Lee 
(2002) and Martinez-Ros and Labeaga (2002). Our exploratory analysis of these firm 
specific effects undertaken through linking the estimated coefficients to a separate 
management survey, suggests that the propensity to undertake R&D is related to both the 
managerial style of the firm – more aggressive and intuitive managers have higher R&D 
ceteris paribus – and the extensive use of incentive schemes for employees within the firm. 
In addition, our estimates support the hypothesis that R&D is higher when the speed of 
technological change is faster, the firm’s ability to absorb knowledge spillovers is greater, 
the enterprise debt ratio is lower and the firm’s product market is less contestable. When we 
examined the subsequent use of the IP system by firms undertaking R&D, we found 
evidence that firms are using the various methods of appropriation, IP and non-IP, as 
complementary packages to capture the quasi-rents from previous R&D expenditure rather 
than as substitutes. 
These results have implications mainly for corporate policy. They suggest that being 
innovative is a long term strategy involving a certain managerial style, incentive schemes for 
employees and routines to absorb knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, they show that more 
innovative firms – as measured by R&D intensity – are using different appropriation 
methods as a complementary and reinforcing package, not alternatives. Appendix 1. The accounting and IP data 
Estimations of the determinants of R&D expenditure and IP registration have used annual 
‘parent’ enterprise level data drawn from the IBISWorld database. These data have been 
matched across to applications for patents, trade marks and designs by Australian companies. 
IBISWorld enterprise data comprise mainly accounting data on all Australian located parent 
companies with an annual turnover over $50m.
††††† We exclude government organisations, 
trusts and partnerships and limit our scope to public and private companies, associations and 
cooperatives. As shown in Table 8, our sample was predominantly public and private 
companies from 1989 to 2002. In 2002, there were 1971 such entities, but 3950 over the 
whole 14 year period. Just over half of all entities reported a profit figure.  
Patent, trade mark and design applications were matched across to the parent company if 
the applicant name matched either the name of the parent or one of its subsidiaries.
‡‡‡‡‡ In 
2002, about 5 per cent of enterprises had made at least one patent application, 33 per cent at 
least one trade mark application and 5 per cent at least one design application. 
Table 8: Companies by type, 2002 
Company type  Number  Percentage  Percentage 
reporting 
profits 
Association 14  0.71  60.21 
Cooperative 17  0.86  74.71 
Public company  1,003  50.89  49.09 
Private company   937  47.54  69.6 
      
Total 1,971  100  59.54 
Source: Companies selected from the IBISWorld dataset. 
Appendix 2: The Melbourne Institute Business Survey 
Data on the external product market conditions, managerial style, human resource practices 
and non-IP forms of appropriation were derived from a business survey of large Australian 
firms during the period from October 2001 to December 2003. The largest 1000 enterprises 
(by total revenue) were chosen from the IBISWorld enterprise database in each of the three 
years, and subsequent to initial calls, 3000 surveys were mailed out, with 652 useable 
surveys returned from 505 unique organisations. This is a response rate of 21.7 per cent, 
which is consistent with surveys of this type (see for example, Huselid 1995, Covin et al. 
2001). The distribution of responses across major industry and size does not differ markedly 
                                                 
††††† It includes Australian owned companies and the highest accounting unit of Australian located foreign 
owned multi-national companies. 
‡‡‡‡‡ A company is defined as a subsidiary of a parent if the latter owns at least 50 per cent of the former.   36
from the initial selected population, implying that the responses should not be biased towards 
a particular group. For our use, we have used the organisation as the unit of analysis and 
have averaged multiple responses from the same firms where they exist. 
Respondents were asked to answer questions using a seven-point Likert scale with the 
anchors 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly agree. Perceptual measures permit comparisons 
across very different organisations and industries and are easy to collect because they place 
fewer burdens on respondents than administrative or factual entries. However, they contain a 
subjective element and thus an undefined error and it would be unwise to over interpret the 
findings.  
Similar to other studies of this type (see for example Arvanitis 2002, Hollenstein 2002), 
the majority of variables used in this paper are constructed using a data reduction method 
and do not rely upon a single variable. The use of a single variable is unlikely to adequately 
measure the underlying latent construct of interest, such as the management style adopted. 
However, we do not want to use a data reduction method that will exclude cases if there is a 
single missing response. Accordingly, we used factor analysis to select from a list of items 
(single questions) which we believed measured our concept. We only kept those items with 
factor loadings above 0.25. We then constructed variables as the average value of the 
selected items. Accordingly, while factor analysis has been used to accept or reject specific 
questions to be included as part of a variable, the actual variable is a simple average of the 
non-missing questions.
 §§§§§ Because the variables are averages of up to 14 items, they are 
very like continuous variables bounded between 1 and 7. Table 9 gives a descriptive 
summary of the factors used in the regressions. 
                                                 
§§§§§ Where appropriate, the 1 to 7 scales were reversed to order items in a consistent direction. All a priori  
innovation items were included in its summated scale.   37
Table 9: Variable definitions 
Variable   Description 
External product market   
Volatile product market  A 5-item, 7 point scale measuring variability in 
demand, competitors, technologies 
Contestability  A 2-item, 7 point scale measuring ease of entry to 
product market  
Management style   
Inflexibility of management  An 8-item, 7 point scale measuring how difficult it 
is for the firm to change in response to external 
conditions  
Systematic style  A 6-item, 7 point scale measuring whether 
managers use systematic analysis rather than 
intuitive methods for making decisions 
Aggressive style  A 5-item, 7 point scale measuring how bold and 
aggressive managers are  
Communication techniques  A 4-item, 7 point scale measuring the extent to 
which management seek to communicate with 
workers  
Human resource management   
Selection methods  An 8-item, 7 point scale measuring extent to which 
firm uses sophisticated selection and training 
practices 
Team work  A 3-item, 7 point scale measuring the extent of 
disaggregated decision making within the firm 
Pay rewards  A 7-item, 7 point scale measuring the extent firms 
use pecuniary incentives to reward employees 
Other  A 3-item, 7 point scale measuring the extent to 
which the firm offers pastoral support, flexible 
working times and internally consistent HRM 
practices. 
Appropriability  
Extent of appropriability  A 14 item, 7 point scale measuring the effectiveness 
of non-IP methods to protect advantages from 
product and process innovations 
  
Source: Melbourne Institute Business Survey 2001, 2003 and 2003   38
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